The False Claims Act: Government Employees as Qui Tam Plaintiffs in the Tenth Circuit by Kovacevic, Miro
Denver Law Review 
Volume 80 
Issue 3 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 7 
December 2020 
The False Claims Act: Government Employees as Qui Tam 
Plaintiffs in the Tenth Circuit 
Miro Kovacevic 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Miro Kovacevic, The False Claims Act: Government Employees as Qui Tam Plaintiffs in the Tenth Circuit, 
80 Denv. U. L. Rev. 625 (2003). 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact 
jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AS
QuI TAM PLAINTIFFS IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
INTRODUCTION
The federal government's chief weapon in battling fraud is the False
Claims Act ("FCA").' Under the FCA, private citizens can bring a civil
suit known as a qui tam action 2 against any person or entity that has filed
a false claim "for payment or approval' 3 with the federal government.4
Upon a favorable judgment, the qui tam plaintiff, also known as the rela-
tor,5 is entitled to a portion of the damages recovered from the defen-
dant.6 Commentators have argued that the FCA is a useful deterrent
against fraud and an excellent tool by which the government can recoup
fraudulently appropriated funds with the help of private citizens. 7 Con-
versely, some have noted that qui tam suits reduce the government's re-
covery of misappropriated funds and may actually interfere with other
efforts to inhibit fraud.8
When Congress amended the FCA in 1986, it enlarged the potential
recovery for private plaintiffs, which in turn resulted in a dramatic in-
crease of qui tam actions.9 With this rise came a proliferation in disputes
over the proper interpretation of the FCA.10 In the period covered by this
survey, September 1, 2001, to August 31, 2002, the Tenth Circuit de-
cided a number of cases interpreting the FCA.t" This survey specifically
1. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000); see Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui
Tam, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 381, 381-82 (2001).
2. Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac
parte sequitur, which translated is: who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter.
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY, SECOND POCKET EDITION 578 (2d ed. 2001).
3. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2000).
4. Id. § 3730(b)(1).
5. Susan G. Fentin, The False Claims Act - Finding Middle Ground Between Opportunity
and Opportunism: The "Original Source" Provision of 3J U.S.C. S 3730(E)(4), 17 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 255,259 (1995).
6. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).
7. Fentin, supra note 5, at 255.
8. Id. at 255-56.
9. Virginia C. Theis, Government Employees as Qui Tam Plaintiffs: Subverting the Purposes
of the False Claims Act, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 225, 226 (1999). In 1987, 33 qui tam actions were filed
while, in 1997, 533 qui tam suits were filed. Phillips & Cohen, Attorneys at Law, Qui Tam Statistics,
at http://www.whistleblowers.comVHTMIJBODY/Stats.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) [herinafter
Qui Tam Statistics]. The amount recovered by the Department of Justice in qui tam suits in 1988
totaled $355,000 while, in the year 2001, the recoveries totaled over $1 billion. See id.
10. See Theis, supra note 9, at 231-39 (discussing different interpretations of FCA terms by
various courts).
11. See United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 282 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 2002);
United States ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Ins. Group, 279 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2002), vacated, 318
F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2003) (en banc); United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 265 F.3d
1157 (10th Cir. 2001); United States ex rel. King v. Hillcrest Health Ctr., Inc., 264 F.3d 1271 (10th
Cir. 2001).
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examines the opinion in United States ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Insur-
ance Group ("Holmes F,),12 which addressed whether government em-
ployees were eligible to file a qui tam action under the FCA, 13 as well as
the recent en banc rehearing of that opinion, United States ex rel. Holmes
v. Consumer Insurance Group ("Holmes If). 
14
Part I of this survey describes the erratic history of the FCA, while
Part II discusses the pertinent portions of the Act itself. Part III examines
Tenth Circuit precedents on applying the FCA. Part IV then analyzes and
compares the Tenth Circuit's major decision concerning qui tam actions
within the survey period (Holmes 1), along with its subsequent en banc
decision (Holmes II), with the opinions of other circuits. Finally, Part V
argues that the Holmes II en banc decision was justified because it cor-
rectly followed Tenth Circuit precedents and appropriately interpreted
the FCA.
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FCA
Qui tam legislation has been ubiquitous since Roman times. 15 Simi-
lar regulations have been part of America's legal code since colonial
times.' 6 Throughout the first century of our republic, the federal legisla-
ture passed several bills containing qui tam provisions.' 7 Congress en-
acted the original FCA in 1863,18 largely in response to both claims of
fraud against the Union Army during the Civil War' 9 and the requests of
President Abraham Lincoln.20
,,21IThe 1863 version of the FCA, also known as the "Lincoln Law,
proscribed conduct knowingly intended to fraudulently appropriate
money from the federal government. 22 The Act included civil and crimi-
nal penalties for those convicted of such acts.2 3 The civil penalties in-
cluded a $2,000 fine for each false claim a defendant made, plus twice
the amount of damages incurred by the government. 24 The criminal pen-
12. 279 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2002), vacated, 318 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
13. Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1248.
14. 318 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
15. J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legisla-
tion, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 566 (2000).
16. Bales, supra note 1, at 387 ("Prior to the American Revolution, several colonies passed
statutes authorizing qui tam suits.").
17. Id. For example, Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 3, 1 Stat. 101, 102, allowed the informer to
collect half the amount of the applicable fine for information on a person failing to file a census
return. Id. at 387 n.37.
18. Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 1, 12 Stat. 696, 696-99.
19. Beck, supra note 15, at 555 ("The Army had received small arms that inspection revealed
to be useless and artillery shells filled with sawdust rather than explosives.").
20. Theis, supra note 9, at 227.
21. Joan R. Bullock, The Pebble in the Shoe: Making the Case for the Government Employee,
60 TENN. L. REV. 365, 368 (1993).
22. Beck, supra note 15, at 555.
23. Fentin, supra note 5, at 258.
24. Bullock, supra note 21, at 369.
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alties allowed a court to fine a defendant between $1,000 and $5,000, or
to imprison him for between one and five years.25 To elicit more qui tam
actions, the Act awarded the informer half of the recovered damages,
plus an award for litigation costs upon successful conclusion of the ac-
tion. 6 Any person who possessed information about a fraudulent claim
filed with the government, whether a government employee or private
citizen, qualified to be a qui tam plaintiff.27 Furthermore, the Act pre-
vented anyone, including the government, from intervening once litiga-
tion commenced.28
Initially, the 1863 version of the FCA was seldom used due to the
general lack of knowledge about its existence 29 and the Union's cutbacks
in defense spending, which curtailed most opportunities for fraud.30 Dur-
ing the 1930s, however, the use and abuse of the FCA increased, 31
largely because the Act did not require a plaintiff to have "independ-
ently-acquired information. 32 Hence, anyone who heard about an accu-
sation through the media33 or copied the information from a government
file or indictment 34 could rush to the courthouse and file a qui tam suit
against the alleged perpetrator.35 The increase in qui tam actions was
further exacerbated by the Supreme Court's decision in United States ex
rel. Marcus v. Hess,36 where the Court held that since "there [were] no
words of exception or qualification," any person, no matter how the in-
formation is gathered, qualified as a qui tam plaintiff.
37
In 1943, due to widespread "parasitic" suits and the Marcus deci-
sion, Congress revised the FCA to reduce the private sector's participa-
tion in qui tam litigation.38 In passing the new amendments, the House of
25. Id.
26. See Theis, supra note 9, at 227.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Bales, supra note 1, at 389.
30. See id. Interestingly, many of the amendments to the FCA have occurred with the fluctua-
tions in defense spending by the federal government. See id. at 385-91 (outlining the history of qui
tam legislation).
31. Id. at 389. ("[Tjhe New Deal and World War I greatly expanded the role of the federal
government in the national economy, and commensurately expanded the opportunities for unscrupu-
lous contractors to defraud the government.").
32. Id.
33. Id. (noting that suits brought by people who learned of fraud through the media were
nicknamed "parasitic" suits).
34. Bullock, supra note 21, at 370.
35. Bales, supra note 1, at 389.
36. 317 U.S. 537 (1943). See Beck, supra note 15, at 556-60, for an excellent discussion of
the Hess case.
37. Marcus, 317 U.S. at 546. In Hess, contractors pled nolo contendere, and were fined
$54,000. Id. at 545. Subsequently, a qui tam plaintiff who brought suit against the contractors won a
judgment of $315,000. Id. at 540. The Supreme Court held the FCA did not prohibit qui tam suits
based upon information acquired from a prior indictment. Id. at 546-48. The Court declined to ex-
trapolate restrictions from the plain language of the statute, but rather gave Congress the opportunity
to provide "specifically for the amount of new information which the informer must produce to be
entitled to reward." Id. at 546 n.9.
38. Theis, supra note 9, at 229. The bill provided:
20031
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Representatives attempted to repeal the entire qui tam provision.39 The
Senate, however, rejected such an extreme measure.4° After debate, the
final version of the 1943 amendments preserved the qui tam concept, but
prohibited plaintiffs from filing actions "based on evidence or informa-
tion in the possession of the United States, or any agency, officer or em-
ployee thereof, at the time such suit was brought. ' l Therefore, under the
new version, government employees were barred from suing under the
Act.42 The statute was further interpreted as disallowing private qui tam
suits when the government already possessed the information, regardless
of the source. 43 Unlike the 1863 version of the Act, the 1943 amend-
ments gave the government the right to intervene.44 Furthermore, under
the 1943 amendments, a qui tam plaintiff's recovery could not exceed
25% of the total damages, or 10% of the total when the government
chose to intervene.45 With such extreme restrictions, the use of the FCA
diminished significantly. 46 More than 40 years later, due to increasing
incidence of fraud perpetrated against the government, Congress found it
imperative to revise the Act again.47
In 1986, Congress amended the FCA to "encourage more private
enforcement suits" 8 by diminishing the Act's strict requirements and
increasing the incentives for potential qui tam plaintiffs to bring claims.49
The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee for the 1986 amendments
to the FCA stated that the purpose of the modernized legislation was to
"encourage any individual knowing of Government fraud to bring that
information forward. 5° Importantly, Congress eliminated the 1943 pro-
vision that prohibited qui tam suits based upon information possessed by
the government at the time of filing.5 Moreover, Congress also removed
the language precluding government employees from filing suit under
the Act.52 Interestingly, although it increased the number of potential qui
The court shall have no jurisdiction to proceed with any [qui tam] suit . . . whenever it
shall be made to appear that such suit was based upon evidence or information in the pos-
session of the United States, or any agency, officer or employee thereof, at the time such
suit was brought....
Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (Supp. 1I 1943)).
39. Fentin, supra note 5, at 260.
40. Id.
41. Theis, supra note 9, at 229 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 232(C)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 229-30.
44. Id. at 229.
45. 31 U.S.C. § 232(C).
46. Bales, supra note 1, at 390.
47. Id.; see also Fentin, supra note 5, at 262 (noting that Congress amended the FCA in 1986
because of outcry over an appellate decision and "the growing pervasiveness of fraud against the
government").
48. United States ex rel. v. Raytheon Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 17, 19 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting S.
REP. No. 99-345, at 23-24 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5288-89).
49. See Beck, supra note 15, at 561-62.
50. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266-67.
51. Theis, supra note 9, at 230.
52. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1988).
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tam plaintiffs, Congress retained a jurisdictional bar against parasitical
suits in the 1986 amendments by excluding actions based upon "public
disclosure of allegations" unless the plaintiff was an "original source" of
that information. 53 Lastly, the 1986 amendments increased the minimum
penalty for each fraudulent act against the government.
54
II. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE FCA
Under the current version of the FCA, private persons, or "relators,"
can sue any person or entity in the name of the federal government 55
who files a false claim with the United States as defined by the statute.56
When the relator files suit, she is required to provide the government "all
material evidence and information" she possesses at that time.57 The
complaint is kept under seal for a period of 60 days, during which time
the government decides if it will intervene.58 If the government does so,
"it shall have the primary responsibility for prosecuting the action."
59
The original plaintiff nevertheless maintains the right to be a party to the
action.60
A qui tam plaintiff is entitled to a portion of the proceeds from a
successful qui tam suit.6 1 The federal government, however, is the pri-
mary beneficiary of recovered damages in any qui tam action.62 If the
government chooses to intervene, the relator is eligible for between 15%
and 25% of the damages recovered in a successful action, "depending
upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the
prosecution of the action." 63 if the government chooses not to join the
action, however, the relator may recover an amount between 25% and
53. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
54. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7).
55. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2000).
56. 31 U.S.C. § 3729. Pertinent portions of the Act state:
Any person who--(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented... a false or fraudu-
lent claim for payment or approval; (2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or
used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the
Government; (3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent
claim allowed or paid; (4) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used,
or to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government or willfully
to conceal the property, delivers, or causes to be delivered, less property than the amount
for which the person receives a certificate or receipt; (5) authorized to make or deliver a
document certifying receipt of property used, or to be used, by the Government and, in-
tending to defraud the Government, makes or delivers the receipt without completely
knowing that the information on the receipt is true; (6) knowingly buys, or receives as a
pledge of an obligation or debt, public property from an officer or employee of the Gov-
ernment, or a member of the Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge the
property; ...
Id. § 3729(a).
57. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
58. Id.
59. Id. § 3730(c).
60. Id.
61. See id. § 3730(d)-(d)(2).
62. See id. § 3729(a)(7).
63. Id. § 3730(d).
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30% of the proceeds upon a favorable decision, "which the court decides
is reasonable for collecting the civil penalty and damages." 64 Damages
under the FCA are defined by 31 U.S.C. § 3729, which, if violated,
makes a defendant liable for "a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and
not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which the
Government sustains because of the act of that person." 65
The Act restricts the federal courts' jurisdiction for particular
claims.66 Courts may not hear suits brought by a member of the armed
forces nor against a member of the armed forces for actions arising out of
her service in the armed forces.67 Also, no suit can be brought against "a
member of Congress, a member of the judiciary, or a senior executive
branch official" if the government possesses the information upon which
the allegations are based.68
The provisions of the statute that have caused the most confusion,
however, are the "public disclosure" restriction and the "original source"
requirement.69 The FCA prohibits qui tam suits based "upon the public
disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or adminis-
trative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Ac-
counting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news
media," unless that person is an "original source of the information.
'70
"Original source" is defined as "an individual who has direct and inde-
pendent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based
and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before
filing [a qui tam action] based on the information.",71 The current version
of the FCA does not provide that government employees are disqualified
as original sources.72
Additionally, whether or not the provisions of the FCA are satisfied
"is a question of subject matter jurisdiction. 73 Since a federal court is a
court of limited jurisdiction, there is no presumption of jurisdiction "ab-
sent a showing of proof by the party asserting federal jurisdiction. 74
Hence, the qui tam plaintiff carries "the burden of alleging facts essential
64. Id. § 3730(d)(2).
65. Id. § 3729(a)(7).
66. See id. § 3730(e).
67. Id. § 3730(e)(1).
68. Id. § 3730(e)(2)(A).
69. These provisions are found in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B).
70. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
71. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
72. See id.
73. United States ex rel. Fine v. Advanced Sciences, Inc., 99 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir.
1996).




to show jurisdiction under the False Claims Act, as well as supporting
those allegations by competent proof.,
75
Finally, the current statute creates even more incentive for a person
with information about fraud on the government to come forward by
76providing protection from employer reprisal. The Act asserts that an
employee who is discharged or discriminated against by her employer for
participation in a qui tam suit "shall be entitled to all relief necessary to
make the employee whole. 77
Il1. TENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS PRECEDENT
Since 1986, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted the
newly enacted amendments to the FCA on several occasions.78 However,
two decisions are relevant to the primary opinions discussed in this sur-
vey.79 The first case deals with the Tenth Circuit's definition of "public
disclosure, 8° while the second case sets forth a test for determining
when a qui tam suit may proceed.81
In United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp.,82 a
former employee of Century Healthcare filed a qui tam action against her
former employer alleging it had repeatedly failed to comply with Medi-
caid requirements. 83 The plaintiff personally gathered information
against the defendant, while the Oklahoma Department of Human Ser-
vices ("DHS") simultaneously conducted an independent investigation.
84
The DHS investigation revealed the same deficiencies that the plaintiff
had uncovered, which were detailed in a report that the DHS provided to
the involved parties.85 Importantly, this report was available to the mem-
bers of the public only by "a written request for the specific record and
approval from the DHS legal department. 86 A district court, relying on
the "public disclosure" bar, held that since the general public could ob-
tain this report, the "'allegations or transactions' therein were 'publicly
disclosed' within the meaning" of the FCA.87
75. Fine, 99 F.3d at 1004.
76. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
77. id.
78. See United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514 (10th Cir.
1996); United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-Ferguson Co., 99 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1996); United States
ex rel. Fine v. Advanced Scis., Inc., 99 F.3d 1000 (10th Cir. 1996); United States ex rel. Fine v.
Sandia Corp., 70 F.3d 568 (10th Cir. 1995).
79. See Fine, 99 F.3d 1538; Ramseyer, 90F.3d 1514.
80. Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1519.
81. Fine, 99 F.3d at 1544.
82. 90 F.3d 1514 (10th Cir. 1996).
83. Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1517.
84. id.
85. Id. The report was given to the administrator of DHS, the defendants, and one copy was
placed within the DHS files. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1518.
2003]
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The Tenth Circuit, finding the rulings of the District of Columbia
Circuit88 and the Ninth Circuit89 persuasive, rejected the district court's
conclusion 9° and held that "in order to be publicly disclosed, the allega-
tions or transactions upon which a qui tam suit is based must have been
made known to the public through some affirmative act of disclosure.'
91
Relying on the congressional objectives of the FCA,92 the court argued
that "mere possession by a person or an entity of information pertaining
to fraud, obtained through an independent investigation and not disclosed
to others, does not amount to 'public disclosure.' 93 Accordingly, the
court found that allowing the relator's suit to proceed concurred with
Congress's aim to encourage persons with "first-hand knowledge of
fraudulent misconduct to report fraud,, 94 since "defendants' fraudulent
activities may have gone undetected because the evidence essentially
was 'hidden in files."'
95
In United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-Ferguson Co.,96 a former em-
ployee of the Inspector General of the Department of Energy who had
been in charge of financially related audits brought suit against MK-
Ferguson Company and Industrial Contractors Corporation.97 His com-
plaint alleged that the companies had filed false and fraudulent reim-
bursement claims with the Department of Energy. 98 A district court con-
cluded that although the plaintiff's allegations were based upon a report
from the Inspector General's Office, which the plaintiff oversaw, the
reports had been publicly disclosed because the office had forwarded
them to a third party.99 Since public disclosure had occurred, the district
court had to decide whether the plaintiff qualified as an "original
source."' ° Because the plaintiff did not conduct any actual investigation
on his own, but rather based his allegations primarily on the submitted
report of the Department of Energy, the district court determined that the
plaintiff could not have had "direct and independent knowledge" of the
information in the allegations and, therefore, he failed to qualify as an
"original source" under the FCA.10' Accordingly, the district court dis-
missed the plaintiff s action, and the plaintiff appealed.1
0 2
88. United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
89. United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512 (9th Cir. 1995).
90. Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1518.
91. Id. at 1519 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 1520 (referring to the FCA as meaning to discover fraud and deter "parasitic" suits).
93. Id. at 1521.
94. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d Cir. 1991)).
95. Id. (quoting Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1161).
96. 99 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1996).
97. Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1540-42.
98. Id. at 1542.
99. Id. at 1543.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. id. at 1541.
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By analyzing the FCA and previous case law,10 3 the Tenth Circuit
developed a four-step inquiry to determine who could qualify as a qui
tam plaintiff. 104 First, a court must decide "whether the alleged public
disclosure contains allegations or transactions from one of the listed
sources." 10 5 Next, a court must determine "whether the alleged disclosure
has been made 'public' within the meaning of the" FCA. 1°6 Third, a court
must determine whether the plaintiff's complaint is "'based upon' this
'public disclosure. ' '107 If so, then the court must decide "whether the
relator qualifies as an 'original source. ' '' 108 The qui tam action proceeds
if there is a negative response to any of the first three inquiries. 1°9 A
court only undertakes a determination of whether the plaintiff qualifies as
an original source when there is an affirmative reply to each of the first
three queries."10
Concluding that the Department of Energy's audit report was one of
the sources of information precluded by the FCA, the Tenth Circuit an-
swered the first inquiry in the positive. 1 Next, the court concluded that
the audit report, which was sent to MK-Ferguson and the State of Ore-
gon, placed no limitations on the State of Oregon, a stranger to the fraud,
that would prevent its dissemination once the report was under their con-
trol. 112 The court found this to be an affirmative act of public disclosure,
thus, answering the second question of the test positively. 113 Next, the
court discussed whether the complaint was based on the allegations or
transactions publicly disclosed in the final audit report. 114 Using the stan-
dard of "whether 'substantial identity' exist[ed] between the publicly
disclosed allegations and the qui tam complaint,""15 the court stated that
the plaintiff's allegations were sufficiently identical to the audit report to
conclude that they were based upon the publicly disclosed allegations.
16
103. The Circuit Court analyzed United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Industries Inc.,
971 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1992). Fine, 99 F.3d at 1543-44.
104. See Fine, 99 F.3d at 1544.
105. Id.
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public
disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a
congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or
investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney Gen-
eral or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
106. Fine, 99 F.3d at 1545. ("[Tlhe court [in Ramseyer,] interpreted the False Claims Act to




110. Id. at 1544.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1544-45.
113. Id. at 1545.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1545 (quoting Precision, 971 F.2d at 553-54).
116. Id. at 1546-47.
2003]
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Lastly, since the first three inquiries were answered in the affirma-
tive, the court sought to determine if the plaintiff was an "original
source" within the meaning of the FCA.I17 The court noted that to qualify
as an "original source," the plaintiff must have "direct and independent
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and
[have] voluntarily provided the information to the government before
filing a qui tam action based on the information.'' 1 8 The plaintiff argued
that he qualified as an original source because he fixed the limits of the
investigatory audit, he recognized the equipment estimates as fraudulent,
and he personally notified the Inspector General of his findings." 9 How-
ever, the court found that the plaintiff did not actually perform the inves-
tigations that revealed the fraudulent activities.12 Instead, investigators
under the plaintiff's guidance were directly responsible for uncovering
the incriminating information. 21 Furthermore, the plaintiffs complaint
consisted only of the information the investigators gathered.1
22
The Tenth Circuit found that since the plaintiff "did not himself dis-
cover the allegedly fraudulent practices[,] ... was not an observer of the
purported fraud," and did not have "'direct and independent knowledge'
of the publicly disclosed allegations and transactions upon which his
Complaint [was] based," he could not qualify as an original source. 
23
Therefore, the court dismissed the plaintiffs claims. 24 Interestingly, the
fact that the plaintiff utilized information that he learned of as a govern-
ment employee was not a stated factor in the court's determination of the
plaintiff's qualifications as a qui tam relator.
25
IV. CAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES BRING A QuI TAM ACTION WITH
INFORMATION GAINED IN THE COURSE OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT?




The Postmaster at the United States Post Office in Poncha Springs,
Colorado, discovered that the Consumer Insurance Group ("CIG") had
misinformed the Post Office about the weight of its mail, and that the
117. Id. at 1544, 1547. If the plaintiff was found to be an "original source" under the FCA, then
his suit could proceed. See id. at 1547. However, if the plaintiff was found not to be an "original
source" under the FCA, and the three preliminary inquiries in Fine have been answered in the af-
firmative, then the suit must be dismissed by the court for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 1544.
118. Id. at 1547.
119. Id. at 1547-48.




124. Id. at 1549.
125. See id. at 1547-48.
126. 279 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2002).
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true weight of its mail disqualified it from receiving the per-pound-rate
for bulk mailing that it had been utilizing.' 27 Upon this discovery, the
Postmaster alerted CIG that it could no longer employ the special rate.
28
A few years later, the Postmaster found that CIG had continued to em-
ploy the original rate and, therefore, had been defrauding the govern-
ment. 29 The Postal Inspection Service initiated an investigation that it
later turned over to the U.S. Attorney's Office.
130
The Postmaster filed a qui tam action under the FCA against CIG. 131
Upon its intervention, the United States moved to dismiss the Postmaster
from the litigation because, it claimed, the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. 132 The government argued that the government's disclosure
of the allegations to three individuals who were then or had been associ-
ated with CIG constituted "public disclosure."'133 Since there was public
disclosure, the government reasoned that the Postmaster would have to
qualify as an "original source" 134 to continue her claim.'35 The United
States further argued that the Postmaster was ineligible for the "original
source" exception and that her claim was jurisdictionally barred. 36 The
district court granted the government's motion, although it did not rely
on the public disclosure bar in doing SO. 137 Since the government was
still investigating CIG's alleged misconduct at the time, the district court
dismissed the Postmaster as a party after concluding that the ongoing




The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, with Chief Judge Tacha writ-
ing for the majority 4° and Circuit Judge Briscoe dissenting, 141 affimed
the lower court's dismissal of the Postmaster, but based its decision on
different grounds than the district court.142 The Tenth Circuit held thatthe Postmaster could not qualify as a proper qui tam plaintiff under the
127. Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1246-47.
128. Id. at 1247.
129. Id.




134. "'[Oiriginal source' means an individual who has direct and independent knowledge of
the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to
the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on the information." 31
U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2000).
135. See Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1247.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1247-48.
139. Id. at 1248.
140. Id. at 1246.
141. Id. at 1258.
142. Id. at 1248.
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FCA. 14 3 The court found the "public disclosure" bar inapplicable and
disagreed with the district court's conclusion that an ongoing govern-
ment investigation was a bar to a qui tam suit. 44 The court, observing
that the Fine four-step inquiry 45 was the appropriate test to judge the
appropriateness of a qui tam claim, decided that in "the specific circum-
stances of [that] case - where a government employee pursues a qui tam
action during an ongoing investigation - [gave] rise to a different in-
quiry."' 46 The court concluded that allowing a qui tam suit to proceed
where the plaintiff is a government employee who is participating in an
ongoing investigation "would destroy the statute's distinction between
the government and relator, would contravene the purpose of the FCA,
and would create impermissible conflicts of interest for federal employ-
ees pursuing such suits.' ' 147 However, the court was careful not to ex-
clude all government employees from pursuing a qui tam action.
148
Interestingly, the court also made a distinction between an "in-
sider's action" and a "non-insider's action."149 The court hinted that if an
action by a government employee is an insider's action, then it would
most likely be upheld. 150 An example of an insider suit would be where a
government employee brings a qui tam suit against his or her supervisor
for defrauding the government. 151 In the instant case, the court found the
Postmaster's suit a non-insider suit since the action was brought by a
government employee against a private company. 1
52
The court observed that the "concept of a qui tam action assumes a
distinction between the government and the individual qui tam plain-
tiff.' 53 However, this distinction between relator and government is lost
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1248-49.
145. Please note that in the Holmes I decision, the opinion referred to the Fine test as the MK-
Ferguson test. Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1250. Contrarily, while Holmes H utilized the same test, the
decision called the inquiry the Fine test. United States ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Ins. Group, 318
F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2003). This survey will follow the Holmes H decision and will refer to
the inquiry as the Fine test. The Fine test asks:
(1) [W]hether the alleged 'public disclosure' contains allegations or transactions from
one of the listed sources; (2) whether the alleged disclosure has been made 'public'
within the meaning of the False Claims Act; (3) whether the relator's complaint is 'based
upon' this 'public disclosure'; and, if so, (4) whether the relator qualifies as an 'original
source' under [§] 3730(e)(4)(B). If the court were to answer 'no' to any of the first three
questions, its inquiry ends at that point and the qui tam action proceeds. The last inquiry,
whether the relator is an original source, is necessary only if the answers to each of the
first three questions is 'yes,' indicating the relator's complaint is based upon a specified
public disclosure.
Fine, 99 F.3d at 1544.
146. Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1250.
147. Id. at 1252.
148. Id. ("It is our view, however, that while the Act does not explicitly authorize or preclude
all actions [brought by government employees], it may allow some and disallow others.").




153. Id. at 1252.
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when a government employee who obtains information about fraud in
accordance with her duties as an employee sues. 154 Hence, the potential
plaintiff "obtains the information as the government" and therefore can-
not file a qui tam suit under § 3730(b) of the FCA "for the person and for
the United States Government."' 155 In the instant case, the Postmaster was
found to have obtained all the information in accordance with her duties
as postmaster and, thus, was acting as the federal government. 156 The
court defended this reading of the FCA by asserting four main policy
arguments. 1
57
First, the court noted that the FCA was instituted to encourage pri-
vate citizens to "expose fraud that the government itself cannot easily
uncover."' 158 Since the Postmaster uncovered the fraudulent activities in
the course of her employment, the court found that the investigation was
easily within the government's capacity to pursue. 159 Next, the court ar-
gued that the 1986 amendments to the FCA reflected "Congress's 'con-
cern that the government was not pursuing known instances of fraud.' ' 16
The court believed that allowing the Postmaster's qui tam suit to proceed
would conflict with the purposes of the FCA 16 1 based on the fact that the
record revealed that the government was investigating CIG's miscon-
duct, coupled with the fact that the relator only brought suit after she was
"confident that the government was adequately investigating her infor-
mation."1
62
Third, the court observed that the FCA was intended to "encourage
private citizens with first-hand knowledge to expose fraud."'163 Here,
there was no need for the government to encourage a private citizen to
assist it in uncovering fraud since the government already possessed the
information provided by the Postmaster.' 64 Furthermore, the court stated
that allowing qui tam actions by federal employees based upon informa-
tion gathered in the course of their employment contradicts Congress's
intention of eliminating "parasitic" suits under the FCA. 165 Throughout
the opinion, the Tenth Circuit continually made a fundamental distinction
between information possessed by the federal government and the inde-
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)).
156. Id. at 1253.
157. Id. at 1255-56.
158. Id. at 1255 (quoting United States ex rel. Fine v. Sandia Corp., 70 F.3d 568, 572 (10th Cir.
1995)).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1256 (quoting United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d
1514, 1520 (10th Cir. 1996)).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1255 (quoting United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus. Inc., 971 F.2d 548,
552 (10th Cir. 1992)).
164. Id. at 1256.
165. Id.
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pendent knowledge of private citizens.' 66 When the government pos-
sesses information that has not been publicly disclosed, private citizens
are still allowed to pursue a qui tam action. 67 However, "[g]overnment
employees frequently have access to government information even
though it has not been 'publicly disclosed."'' 68 Thus, the court noted that
a potential exists for "parasitic qui tam suits by government employees
before 'public disclosure' occurs, just as there is a potential for such suits
by private persons following public disclosure."' 69
Lastly, the court argued that the statutory restrictions placed on fed-
eral employees to avoid conflicts of interest further supports the conclu-
sion that federal employees should not be able to act as qui tam plaintiffs
in circumstances like those presented in the case. 170 Citing the Code of
Federal Regulation, the court observed that federal employees are
prohibited from using "'nonpublic Government information' to 'further
any private interest. '""17' Furthermore, the court also cited other federal
statutes that prohibit a government employee from participating in
government matters when the employee has a financial interest, such as
"the use of public office for private gain, the use of government property
or time for personal purposes, and holding a financial interest that may
conflict with the impartial performance of government duties."'
172
Accordingly, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs action in the case
"directly reduce[d] the amount that the government may ultimately
collect," which would give the government employee a personal stake in
the outcome of the litigation. 73 Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
the plaintiff was not a proper relator under the FCA and dismissed the
suit on the grounds that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
74




In February 2003, sitting en banc, 176 with Circuit Judge Briscoe





170. Id. at 1257.
171. Id. (quoting 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(3) (2003)).
172. Id. (citations omitted) (referring to 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.402, 2635.501, 2635.502,
2635.101 (b)(7), 2635.702, 2635.704-5, 2635.403).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1258.
175. 318 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2003).
176. There is no source that explains the Tenth Circuit's decision to rehear Holmes I en banc.
177. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1200, 1215. Circuit Judges Seymour, Ebel, Henry, Murphy, Hartz




Circuit vacated its decision in Holmes 1178 and reversed the district
court.
17 9 The Tenth Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that the
four-part inquiry defined in Fine'80 "is applicable only 'where the gov-
ernment is not actively investigating the alleged wrongdoing."", 181 Rather,
the Tenth Circuit found the Fine test "applicable in all cases filed by qui
tam relators. ' ' 82 The Tenth Circuit also held that because no "public dis-
closure" occurred, there was no need for it to address whether or not the
Postmaster qualified as an "original source" under the FCA. 183 Lastly, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that the relator, even though she brought the qui
tam claim against CIG with information gained in her capacity as a
postmaster, was a "person" permitted to bring suit under the FCA. 84
The government initially argued that the Postmaster should be re-
moved from the litigation since a "public disclosure" occurred when
three former and present employees of CIG were interviewed and noti-
fied of the allegation that CIG had committed fraud. 85 However, the
court rejected this argument because the public disclosure bar was inap-
plicable since "all three individuals participated to some degree, in the
alleged fraudulent scheme" and were thus "previously informed."' 18 6 The
government further maintained that if the court did not accept its modi-
fied view of the "public disclosure" test, the government would "be
forced 'to make disclosures of relevant allegations to 'innocent' third
parties in order to satisfy the public disclosure bar - and ensure that op-
portunistic qui tam suits" would be barred. 87 The court refuted this con-
tention by questioning the government's "blanket characterization of qui
tam suits filed by government employees as 'opportunistic.""1 88 The
court asserted that the Postmaster's action was not opportunistic, since
she had "direct and independent knowledge of the fraud allegedly com-
mitted by CIG" and because she was the individual who first discovered
the fraudulent activities by CIG. 189 The court further rejected the gov-
ernment's position because it found the "public disclosure" test robust.19°
Lending to this conclusion was the court's determination that no other
test echoed the language of § 3730(e)(4)(A) as accurately.' 91 Since the
178. Id. at 1245.
179. Id.
180. See Fine, 99 F.3d at 1004, for a description of the inquiry.
181. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1203.
182. Id. at 1204.
183. Id. at 1204, 1208.
184. Id. at 1204.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1204-05. "[Pjublic disclosure occurs only when the allegations or fraudulent trans-
actions are affirmatively provided to others not previously informed thereof." Id. at 1205 (citing
Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1521).
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court found that no public disclosure had occurred, the court halted its
Fine four-step jurisdictional inquiry and it did not answer the question of
whether the qui tam plaintiff qualified as an "original source."'
192
The government next contended that a government employee who is
required to disclose information about fraudulent activities obtained in
the course of her occupational obligations does not qualify as a "person"
permitted to bring a qui tam action under § 3730(b)(l1). 93 In establishing
its framework for analyzing cases brought under the FCA, the court
stated that "in all cases involving statutory construction, our starting
point must be the language employed by Congress[ ]... and we assume
that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the
words used."' 94 Furthermore, "[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative
intention to the contrary, that language [of the statute] must ordinarily be
regarded as conclusive."'' 95 The court examined the relevant portion of
the FCA, 196 and noted that nowhere in the statute is the word "person"
defined.197 The court found that the Dictionary Act t98 defined "person"
"for the purposes of 'determining the meaning of any Act of Congress'
as including 'individuals. '' 199 Hence, the court concluded that "person"
"unambiguously encompasses all individual human beings, including
[the Postmaster] .,200
The government further argued that the title of § 3730(b) of the
FCA, "Actions by private persons," demonstrated that Congress intended
to limit the ability of government employees to bring suit under the
FCA.20 1 The court, however, found that the title, which was part of the
1986 amendments, "was simply intended as an easy reference for the
reader of the statute, and not as a substantive amendment to [the
FCA]. ' '2°2 Furthermore, the court cited the Supreme Court's explanation
192. Id. at 1208.
193. Id. That section states:
A person may bring a civil action for a violation of [§] 3729 for the person and for the
United States Government. The action shall be brought in the name of the Government.
The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give written con-
sent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).
194. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1208 (quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68
(1982)).
195. Id. (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980)).
196. The relevant portion of the FCA was § 3730(b)(1). Id. That section provides:
A person may bring a civil action for a violation of [§] 3729 for the person and for the
United States Government. The action shall be brought in the name of the Government.
The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give written con-
sent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).
197. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1208.
198. The court used this term to refer to 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). See id.
199. Id. (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1).
200. Id. at 1208-09.




that a title to a statutory provision may not "limit the plain meaning of
the text," and can only be utilized as a reference when "[it] shed[s] light
on some ambiguous word or phrase., 20 3 The court also noted that the title
could mean either that all government employees would were excluded
or that all government employees were included as persons capable of
filing a qui tam suit under the FCA. 204 However, the court found that the
potential total prohibition of government employees from being able to
file FCA claims "would render superfluous the specific exclusions
adopted by Congress in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(1).
' 20 5
Next, the government asserted that Congress's intention to exclude
government employees from acting as qui tam plaintiffs under the FCA
was "inadequately expressed. ' '206 In rejecting this argument, the court
stated that it "appears clear that Congress did not consider the question of
whether government employees should be allowed to use information
obtained in the course of their employment as the basis for a qui tam
action."207 Hence, the court reasoned that if it were to follow the Gov-
ernment's plea to exclude government employees, it would actually re-
write the statute.20 8
Next, following Chief Judge Tacha's decision in Holmes I, the gov-
ernment averred that allowing a government employee to bring a qui tam
suit with information gained in the course of her employment would
eliminate "the critical distinction between the government and the indi-
vidual qui tam plaintiff. '' 209 The court answered by stating that it "fail[ed]
to see how the word ['person'] could rationally be construed to exclude
some, but not all, government employees, and under some, but not all,
conditions. 210 In addition, the court discussed how the principles of
agency law further controverted the government's position.211 The court
stated that "it is apparent that [the Postmaster], in filing her complaint in
this matter, was not acting within the scope of her employment and was
therefore not acting 'as the government' since she was not employed to
file suit under the FCA.' ,212 Therefore, although the Postmaster might
have gained the information used in the qui tam claim in the course of
203. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212
(1998)).
204. Id.
205. Id. Section 3730(e)(1) mandates that: "No court shall have jurisdiction over an action
brought by a former or present member of the armed forces under subsection (b) of this section
against a member of the armed forces arising out of such person's service in the armed forces." 31
U.S.C. § 3730(e)(1).
206. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1209.
207. Id. at 1209-10.
208. Id. at 1210.
209. Id.; Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1252.
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her employment, the postmaster was acting "as a 'person,' i.e., in her
,,211
individual capacity, in filing and pursuing this qui tam action.
One of the dissent's primary arguments focused on the language of
the FCA that empowers a plaintiff to file a qui tam suit "for the person
and for the United States Government." 214 The dissent argued that this
phrase revealed "a fundamental assumption ' 2 5 about the qui tam plain-
tiffs, which "requires that there be some distinction between a potential
qui tam relator and the people acting as 'the government' with regard to
the fraud at issue. ' ' 6 The majority, however, maintained that "the dis-
sent read[] too much into the phrase., 21 7 The court found that the phrase
indicated "that the relator functions as the partial assignee of the United
States and [that the phrase] emphasize[d] that both the relator and the
government have an interest in the lawsuit and both will benefit should
any recovery occur. 21 8 Further, the court argued, if Congress had in-
tended "to exclude some or all federal government employees from the
class of' of possible qui tam plaintiffs, it was able to do so in a much
more obvious and definite manner.219 Additionally, the court noted that
since the FCA utilizes the term "person" numerous times, the dissent's
limitation of that term failed because it was contrary to the doctrine that
"identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to
have the same meaning. '220 The majority found the interpretation of the
FCA by the Supreme Court in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess
22
1
persuasive.2 2 There, the Supreme Court found no exceptions or qualifi-
cation of the jurisdictional phrase "as well for himself as for the United
States," and it also noted that the original FCA allowed anyone to bring
suit under the FCA.223 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit concluded that al-
though Congress changed the language of the FCA to "for the person and
for the United States Government," it was difficult to find that "the
change was intended to override Marcus and implement new restrictions
on who could qualify as relator.,
224
Lastly, the government argued that allowing the Postmaster's suit to
continue would be contrary to numerous federal regulations, the purpose
of the FCA, and public policy.225 The Tenth Circuit replied by observing
that "nothing in the FCA expressly precludes federal employees from
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1217 (Tacha, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)).
215. Id.'(Tacha, C.J., dissenting).
216. Id. (Tacha, C.J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 1210.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1211 (quoting Dep't of Revenue v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 342 (1994)).
221. 31 U.S. 537 (1943).
222. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1211.
223. Id. (quoting Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 4, 12 Stat. 696, 698).
224. Id. at 1211-12 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)).
225. Id. at 1212.
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filing qui tam suits. '226 Further, the court noted that it appeared that Con-
gress probably did not consider the possibility of government employees
bringing qui tam suits under the FCA.227 In addition, the court noted that
Congress's activity since the 1986 amendments implies that Congress
may see the FCA as allowing actions by government employees. 228 Spe-
cifically, the court cited two different bills introduced in Congress that
"would have established limitations on government employees who
file[d] qui tam suits based on information gained during the course of
their employment. 229 Nonetheless, Congress passed neither bill.23°
Lastly, the Tenth Circuit turned to the reasoning of the Eleventh
Circuit to justify why government employees can utilize information
gathered in the course of their employment as the basis of a qui tam
suit.231 Specifically the Tenth cited the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning from
United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp.:232
We recognize that the concerns articulated by the United States
may be legitimate ones, and that the application of the False Claims
Act since its 1986 amendment may have revealed difficulties in the
administration of qui tam suits, particularly those brought by gov-
ernment employees .... Notwithstanding this recognition, however,
we are charged only with interpreting the statute before us and not
with amending it to eliminate administrative difficulties. The limits
upon the judicial prerogative in interpreting statutory language were
well articulated by the Supreme Court when it cautioned:
Legislation introducing a new system is at best empirical, and
not infrequently administration reveals gaps or inadequacies of one
sort or another that may call for amendatory legislation. But it is no
warrant for extending a statute that experience may disclose that it
should have been made more comprehensive. "The natural meaning
of words cannot be displaced be reference to difficulties in admini-
stration." . . .For the ultimate question is what has Congress com-
manded, when it has given no clue to its intentions except familiar
English words and no hint by the draftsmen of the words that they
meant to use them in any but an ordinary sense. The idea which is
now sought to be read into the [Act] ... is not so complicated nor is
English speech so poor that words were not easily available to ex-
press the idea or at least to suggest it.
233
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1212 (citing Major David Wallace, Government Employees as Qui Tam Relators,
ARMY LAW., Aug. 1996, at 14, 22 ("The sponsors of the 1986 FCA amendments simply did not
contemplate the issue of government employees using information they learned in the course of their
duties as the basis of lawsuits in their own names.")).
228. Id. at 1213.
229. Id. (quoting Theis, supra note 9, at 238-39).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. 931 F.2d 1493 (1 lth Cir. 1991).
233. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1214 (quoting Williams, 931 F.2d 1493, 1503-04 (11th Cir. 1991)
(quoting Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., 322 U.S. 607, 617 (1944))).
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Congress could have certainly indicated its desire to prevent
government employees from filing qui tam suits based upon informa-
tion acquired in the course of their government employment.... The
False Claims Act is devoid of any statutory language that indicates a
jurisdictional bar against government employees as qui tam plaintiffs.
We also note an absence of any clear indication that Congress in-
tended such a bar to be implied in spite of the plain language of the
statute. Therefore, we decline to judicially create an exception where
none exists.
234
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction and found that the Postmaster qualified to act
as a qui tam plaintiff and hence allowed her action to proceed.235
C. Other Circuits
1. First Circuit: United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co.
236
a. Facts
A former employee for the United States Government Defense Con-
tract Administrative Service filed suit against Raytheon Company Inc.,
alleging that it had committed fraud in its administration of contracts
with the federal government.23' The district court held that all govern-
ment employees were excluded from bringing qui tam suits under the
FCA.238 The district court reasoned that since "government employees
maintain a dual status--arms of the government while at work, private
citizens while not a work--a 'public disclosure' necessarily occurs when-
ever a government employee uses government information he learned on
the job to file a qui tam suit in his private capacity." 239 Therefore, the
district court dismissed the plaintiff's claim.
240 The plaintiff appealed.241
b. Decision
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, after studying the issue of
whether a government employee falls within one of the four excluded
groups within § 3730(e)(4), upheld the district court's decision, but upon
different grounds.242 Initially, the First Circuit found that 31 U.S.C. §
3730(e)(4)(A),243 contrary to the district court's findings, only barred
234. Id. (quoting Williams, 931 F.2d at 1504).
235. Id. at 1215.
236. 913 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
237. LeBlanc, 913 F.2d at 18.
238. Id. at 18, 19-20.
239. Id. at 19 (quoting United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., Inc., 729 F. Supp. 170,
175 (D. Mass. 1990)).
240. Id. at 18.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 19-20.
243. That section provides:
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suits "based on information made available to the public during the
course of a government hearing, investigation, or audit or from the news
media.",244 Moreover, the court rejected the notion that government em-
ployees "lead schizophrenic lives and can publicly disclose information
to themselves, 245 and found that the district court's analysis created an
exception to federal court jurisdiction not found within the language of
the FCA.246 Hence, the court concluded that § 3730 (e)(4)(A) "does not
prevent government employees from bringing qui tam actions based on
information acquired during the course of their employment.
', 247
The First Circuit held, however, that a government employee who,
as a condition of his employment, was responsible for exposing fraud
could not qualify as an "original source" under the FCA.248 The court
reasoned that the "fruits of [the plaintiff's] effort belonged to his em-
ployer--the government," therefore, he "was not someone with 'inde-
pendent knowledge of the information"' used in the allegations.249 Fi-
nally, the court limited its holding by concluding that its decision did
"not mean that.., no government employee.., could qualify to bring a
qui tam action under the original source exception.2 z0
2. Eleventh Circuit: United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp.
251
a. Facts
The plaintiff, an attorney for the United States Air Force in charge
of the Contracts Law Division at Yokota Air Base, Japan, brought a qui
tam suit against NEC Corporation with information he had gained in the
course of his employment.252 He alleged that the company had commit-
ted fraud by participating in "bidrigging" while it sought telecommunica-
tions contracts with the federal government.253 The United States inter-
vened and moved to have a trail court remove the plaintiff for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.254 The government asserted that the plaintiff
had gathered all the information in the complaint while he was an em-
ployee of the government and, thus, was jurisdictionally barred by the
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public
disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a
congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or
investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney Gen-
eral or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).







251. 931 F.2d 1493 (1 lth Cir. 1991).
252. Williams, 931 F.2d at 1494-95.
253. Id. at 1495.
254. Id.
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FCA.255 The district court agreed with the United States and granted the
25625motion. The plaintiff appealed. 7
b. Decision
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's ruling because it
found the FCA unambiguous and "devoid of any statutory language that
indicate[d] a jurisdictional bar against government employees as qui tam
plaintiffs.2 58 The United States argued that the plaintiffs qui tam claim
was precluded because when a "government employee uses official in-
formation as a private citizen, he has disclosed the information to himself
so that a 'public disclosure' occur[red]. ' ',59 On the other hand, if a gov-
ernment employee uses the information in an official capacity, then no
public disclosure has occurred. 260 The court rejected this contention by
noting that the acts that constitute public disclosure under the FCA are
"not qualified by words that would indicate that they are only examples
of the types of 'public disclosure' to which the jurisdictional bar would
apply."261 The court pointed to the language of § 3730(e)(4)(A), which
prohibits qui tam suits that are "based upon the public disclosure of alle-
gations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a
congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report,
hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media., 262 Therefore,
the court refused to give the statute "a broader effect than that which
appears in its plain language.1
263
Interestingly, the court then refused to analyze whether the plaintiff
in the case before it was an original source according to the FCA. 264 The
court noted that "[tihe 'original source' inquiry only becomes necessary
once a court makes a factual determination that the particular qui tam suit
before it was based upon information that was publicly disclosed."
265
Hence, because the commencement of a qui tam action by a government
employee is not a public disclosure under the FCA, there was no need to
discuss whether the plaintiff was in fact an "original source. 266
255. Id. at 1494.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1495.
258. Id. at 1504.
259. Id. at 1499.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1499-1500.
262. Id. at 1499 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)). The court also stated that "[a] plain
reading of this language reveals that 'congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting
Office' modifies 'report, hearing, audit, or investigation.' Any other reading of that phrase would be
illogical." Id. at 1500 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)).
263. Id. at 1449-1500.




2003] QUI TAM SUITS
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit held that "nothing in [§ 3730(e)(4)(A)
of the FCA] operates to preclude every government employee from
bringing a qui tam action based upon information acquired in the course
of his government employment" unless precluded by the "public disclo-
sure" bar.267 The court found the four limitations set forth in 31 U.S.C. §
3730(e)268 conclusive, and reasoned that if Congress had wished to pre-
clude government employee actions, it could have done so explicitly.
V. ANALYSIS
In Holmes 11,270 the Tenth Circuit properly reheard Holmes 1271and
reversed the district court's decision. The circuit's second determination
was justified for several reasons. Holmes I subverted Tenth Circuit
precedent. In addition, the FCA is devoid of any language that precludes
government employees from filing a qui tam suits. Furthermore, the
Postmaster's suit is congruent with the purposes of the FCA. Finally,
allowing government employees to bring these suits would aid tremen-
dously in recovering fraudulently appropriated assets.
In order for the Tenth Circuit to rehear a case en banc, there must be
a need for the entire court to focus "on an issue of exceptional public
importance or on a panel decision that conflicts with a decision ... of
[that] court. '272 Holmes I satisfied both of these requirements since it
conflicted with the precedents of United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Cen-
tury Healthcare Corp.273 and United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-Ferguson
Co. 274 The question presented in that case "involve[d] a question of ex-
ceptional importance, i.e., whether and under what circumstances a dis-
trict court has jurisdiction over a qui tam complaint brought under the
267. Id. at 1501.
268. Subsections (1) through (4) of § 3730(e) bar actions when:
[(1)] brought by a former or present member of the armed forces... against a member of
the armed forces arising out of such person's service in the armed forces... [(2)] brought
. . . against a Member of Congress, a member of the judiciary, or a senior executive
branch official if the action is based on evidence or information known to the Govern-
ment when the action was brought ... [(3)] based upon the allegations or transactions
which are the subject of a civil suit or an administrative civil money penalty proceeding
in which the Government is already a party... [and (4)] based upon the public disclosure
of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congres-
sional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or inves-
tigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or
the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(l)-(4).
269. Williams, 931 F.2d at 1502.
270. 318 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2003).
271. 279 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2002).
272. 10TH CIR. R. 35.1(A).
273. 90 F.3d 1514, 1521 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding that since the qui tam plaintiff did not
have first hand knowledge of fraudulent misconduct, the lower court should have dismissed her
claim).
274. 99 F.3d 1538, 1548 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding that since the qui tam plaintiff was not
an original source, the lower court properly dismissed her complaint).
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False Claims Act by a government employee relator., 275 The Holmes I
decision improperly modified Tenth Circuit precedent and created a ju-
risdictional bar to certain potential qui tam plaintiffs276 despite the fact
that the test conceived in Fine was the result of a practical and logical
analysis of the FCA.277 Although the Fine court did not explicitly decide
whether a federal employee could bring a qui tam suit, the decision im-
plies that there are no specific limitations on the inquiry.278 The test an-
nounced in that case illustrates that the FCA lacks any express language
precluding government employees from filing qui tam suits. 279 The Tenth
Circuit's decision in Holmes II was proper since it followed this prece-
dent.
The 1986 amendments to the FCA removed the language precluding
government employees from filing qui tam suits. 280 To interpret a statute,
a court should "begin with the plain language of the law., 28' The plain
meaning of the words in a statute "must be construed in their 'ordinary,
everyday sense.' 282 In Holmes II, the court appropriately read the plain
meaning of the words into the FCA and found that nowhere were gov-
ernment employees excluded.283 Notwithstanding the fact that a different
version of the FCA was at issue, Holmes 1H correctly followed the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the FCA in United States ex rel. Marcus
v. Hess284 and found that since government employees are not expressly
precluded from filing suit under the FCA, the Postmaster's suit should
have been allowed to proceed.285
Additionally, as the Holmes II court noted, if the interpretation of
the term "person" in Holmes I was allowed to stand, its prohibition of
government employees bringing qui tam actions "would render superflu-
275. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 3, United States ex rel. Holmes v. Con-
sumer Ins. Group, 318 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-1077).
276. See Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1251.
277. The Fine test involves four inquiries:
(1) whether the alleged 'public disclosure' contains allegations or transactions from one
of the listed sources; (2) whether the alleged disclosure has been made 'public' within the
meaning of the False Claims Act; (3) whether the relator's complaint is 'based upon' this
'public disclosure'; and, if so, (4) whether the relator qualifies as an 'original source' un-
der [§] 3730(e)(4)(B). If the court were to answer 'no' to any of the first three questions,
its inquiry ends at that point and the qui tam action proceeds. The last inquiry, whether
the relator is an original source, is necessary only if the answers to each of the first three
questions is 'yes,' indicating the relator's complaint is based upon a specified public dis-
closure.
Fine, 99 F.3d at 1544.
278. See id. at 1544-49.
279. See id.
280. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2000).
281. United States v. Morgan, 922 F.2d 1495, 1496 (10th Cir. 1991).
282. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 208 F.3d 871, 876 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Julius M.
Israel Lodge of B'nai B'rith v. Comm'r, 98 F.3d 190, 191 (5th Cir. 1996)).
283. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1212.
284. 317 U.S. 537, 546 (1943) (noting that since the statute did not include "words of excep-
tion" the Court would not read such words into the statute).
285. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1213, 1215.
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ous the specific exclusions adopted by Congress in 31 U.S.C. §
3730(e)(1)," which prohibit "former or present member[s] of the armed
forces' from filing qui tam actions 'against a member of the armed forces
arising out of such person's service in the armed forces. 286 Interestingly,
as Chief Judge Tacha, the author of the Holmes I decision, once wrote,
the Tenth Circuit "refrains from construing the words and phrases of a
statute - or entire statutory provisions - in a way that renders them su-
perfluous. 287
Furthermore, by creating an additional restriction on who can qual-
ify as a qui tam plaintiff, thereby making a portion of the FCA unneces-
sary, Holmes I effectively rewrote the FCA and invaded the legislative
function of Congress. 288 As the Eleventh Circuit stated, "Congress could
have certainly indicated its desire to prevent government employees from
filing qui tam suits based upon information acquired in the course of
their government employment," but in the "absence of any clear indica-
tion that Congress intended such a bar to be implied in spite of the plain
language of the statute," none should be incorporated.289 Furthermore, as
Holmes 1I stated, "[a]lthough there may be sound public policy reasons
for limiting government employees' ability to file qui tam actions, that is
Congress' prerogative, not [a court's],290
In 1993, the Department of Justice, which would have agreed with
the Holmes I decision, urged Congress to amend the Act to specifically
exclude government employees from such actions. 291 Holmes I found
Congress's decision not to accept these proposed amendments persua-
sive.292 The fact that Congress has taken no such action in nearly a dec-
ade further supports this contention. If Congress had accepted the view
of the Department of Justice, it could have easily taken the necessary
steps to expressly preclude federal employees from bringing qui tam
actions.293 However, Congress may simply be waiting to see how the
various circuits will resolve this issue. This argument is supported by the
fact that the three circuits that have addressed this issue, the First, Tenth
(Holmes 1), and Eleventh, have all come to their respective decisions
differently. 294 The Eleventh Circuit's conclusion, which Holmes II and
286. Id. at 1209 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(1)).
287. United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1330 (10th Cir. 1998).
288. See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419 (1971) ("[l1t is for Congress, not ... [the Supreme]
Court, to rewrite the statute."); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 74 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissent-
ing) ("[Tihe Court's reduction of the statutory wording to equivalence in effect with the constitu-
tional immunity, nearly if not quite makes that wording redundant or meaningless; in any event, it
goes so far in rewriting the statutory language as to amount to invasion of the legislative function.").
289. Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1267 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (quoting United States ex rel. Williams
v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1504 (11 th Cir. 1991)).
290. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1214.
291. Bullock, supra note 21, at 368.
292. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1213.
293. Bullock, supra note 21, at 368.
294. See United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990);
Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1248; Williams, 931 F.2d at 1496 n.7, 1502.
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this survey advocate, was decided in 1991, while the First Circuit handed
down its decision in 1990.295 Therefore, Congress's silence may indicate
that it agrees with the Eleventh Circuit's decision since Congress, if it
disagreed with the court's conclusion, probably would not have allowed
that decision to stand for the past twelve years.296
Holmes I argued that allowing government employees to bring qui
tam suits is contrary to the purposes of the FCA.297 Citing United States
ex rel. Fine v. Sandia Corp.,298 the court stated that the purpose of the
FCA is "to encourage private citizens to expose fraud that the govern-
ment itself cannot easily uncover." 299 Holmes I averred that the informa-
tion the Postmaster uncovered did "not constitute information that the
government would not otherwise uncover. [Further,] [t]he duty to report
itself assures that [the Postmaster's] information is the government's
information.,, 300 This statement refers to the fact that once a government
employee has uncovered fraud in the course of her employment, the gov-
ernment does possess that information per se. The 1986 amendments to
the FCA, however, expanded the number of qui tam actions possible by
allowing suits even when the government possesses the information on
which the complaint is based, so long as there has been no public disclo-
sure.30 1 Hence, it is hard to justify why the court that decided Holmes I
did not allow the Postmaster's suit to proceed.
Interestingly, allowing the Postmaster's action can be considered
contrary to the FCA's purpose of enticing whistle-blowers, since the
302Postmaster was not a CIG employee. It was undisputed, however, that
employees of CIG knew of the company's fraud and failed to report it to
the appropriate authorities or file a qui tam suit. 30 3 It is possible that one
of the employees had considered such action; however, no one had taken
action two years after the fraud began.304 Hence, allowing a government
employee to file a qui tam suit would serve two purposes. First, it would
prevent opportunistic employees from allowing fraud to continue in or-
der to maximize their qui tam recovery. Secondly, it would force every
potential qui tam plaintiff, both government and private employees alike,
295. See Leblanc, 913 F.2d 17; Williams, 931 F.2d 1493.
296. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488 (1940) ("The long time failure of
Congress to alter the Act after it had been judicially construed, and the enactment by Congress of
legislation which implicitly recognizes the judicial construction as effective, is persuasive of legisla-
tive recognition that the judicial construction is the correct one."); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480
U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987) ("Congress has not amended the statute to reject our construction, nor have
any such amendments even been proposed, and we therefore may assume that our interpretation was
correct.").
297. Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1255.
298. 70 F.3d 568 (10th Cir. 1995).
299. Holmes, 279 F.2d at 1255 (quoting Fine, 70 F.3d at 572).
300. Id.
301. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730.
302. See Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1251 n.5, 1256.
303. See id. at 1248.
304. See id. at 1247.
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to bring forth information about fraudulent activity as soon as possible.
Although government employees may not be considered whistle-blowers
in the traditional sense, their standing as potential qui tam plaintiffs
would enhance the effectiveness of the FCA.
The 1986 amendments to the FCA reflect Congress's intent to allow
qui tam actions even though the federal government possesses the infor-
mation that forms the basis of the claim, except where that information
has been publicly disclosed and the plaintiff is not an original source to
that information. °5 Those amendments are "Congress' attempt to find
'the golden mean between adequate incentives for whistle-blowing insid-
ers with genuinely valuable information and discouragement of oppor-
tunistic plaintiffs who have no significant information to contribute of
their own. ' ' '306 A government employee who discovers fraud perpetrated
against the government in the course of her work obligations is not an
opportunistic relator, she is simply using information that she has gath-
ered.3 °7
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit already decided how to determine
308when a governmental employee is acting in a parasitic manner in Fine.
There, a government employee attempted to bring a qui tam suit with
information gathered by individuals whose work he oversaw. 3° Using its
newly fashioned test, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the government
employee was simply using information discovered by others and thus
was precluded from acting as a qui tam plaintiff.310 In Holmes, however,
the Postmaster was the individual who discovered the information that
was used to recover the funds that were fraudulently appropriated from
the federal government. 31! Therefore, the Postmaster deserved to con-
tinue with her action.
Although the Tenth Circuit made a number of persuasive arguments
against allowing suits brought by government employees in Holmes /,312
several policy arguments support permitting the Postmaster's suit.313
First, in many instances the government may be completely incapable of
discovering fraudulent activities.31 4 Thus, in such circumstances, the ex-
tra time a diligent government employee spent investigating what she
305. Id. at 1260 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel.
Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 946 (1997)).
306. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649
(D.C. Cir. 1994)).
307. See id. at 1270 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
308. See Fine, 99 F.3d at 1548.
309. Id. at 1543.
310. Id. at 1548.
311. Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1270 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
312. Id. at 1257.
313. See Bullock, supra note 21, at 366, for an in depth analysis of arguments from both sides
of this issue.
314. See id. at 386.
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believed was fraud would be extremely useful to the government.1 5
Taxpayers can only benefit from government employees having greater
incentive to report fraud in situations where that activity may never be
reported otherwise.31 6 Importantly, no distinction should be made be-
tween government employees who bring qui tam suits with information
gathered in the course of their duty and those who go above and beyond
their employment obligations since courts do not distinguish between
non-government employees that way.
Furthermore, many fraudulent actions are never discovered because
of budgetary problems.3t 7 Many investigations are cut short and never
completed.318 If government employees were given an incentive to ex-
plore such activities, taxpayers would not only benefit from the money
recovered, but would also benefit from the free investigations conducted
by these diligent employees. 319 Lastly, many people might be deterred
from committing fraud against the government "if they knew that they
could not rely on the ineptitude or malaise of government employees in
ferreting out illegal activity.
320
Clearly, allowing a federal employee, or any person for that matter,
to retain a portion of the proceeds recovered in a qui tam action reduces
the amount the federal government recoups, which indirectly affects tax-
payers. But, as § 3729(a)(7) of the FCA makes clear, a defendant can be
held liable for "not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3
times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of
the act of that person.,, 32' Therefore, compensating a relator does not
prevent the government from recovering its true losses. Further, the fed-
eral government may recover a significantly greater amount of money
than it lost, so it is unclear why a federal employee who furnished the
federal government with the information it used to try the defendant
should be prohibited from enjoying a portion of the judgment.
Since Congress amended the FCA in 1986, the number of qui tam
suits has soared.322 In 1987, only 33 qui tam cases were filed, while 533
315. See id. at 384.
[Tihe United States Merit Systems Protection Board conducted a survey in 1983 that
found sixty-nine percent of government employees who believed they had direct knowl-
edge of illegalities failed to report the information. Those employees who chose not to
report fraud were then asked why they had failed to come forward. The most frequently
cited reason given ([fifty-three] percent) was the belief that nothing would be done to cor-
rect the activity even if reported.
Id.
316. Id. at 386.
317. See id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 387.
320. Id.
321. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (emphasis added).
322. See Phillip & Cohen, Attorneys at Law, History of the Law, at
http://www.whistleblowers.com/HTML/BODY/history.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
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were filed in 1997.323 Although the number of suits have tapered in re-
cent years, with only 300 qui tam suits filed in 2001, the amount recov-
ered in cases where the government decides to intervene has steadily
risen from $355,000 in 1988, to $1.07 billion in 2001.324 These numbers
demonstrate how important qui tam suits have become to conserving
federal resources. The Holmes I decision could have diminished the gov-
ernment's recovery of misappropriated funds. Holmes II, however, pre-
vented this potential from being realized and actually implemented an-
other deterrent against those who propose to defraud the government.
CONCLUSION
The FCA has had a long and curious existence. The ever-changing
interpretation of the statute recently took a difficult turn in the Tenth
Circuit, but the court's common sense en banc decision put the circuit
back on the correct course. There are many arguments why government
employees should not be able to utilize information gathered in the
course of employment to bring qui tam actions. However, the arguments
in favor of their allowance are superior.
In Holmes II, the Tenth Circuit properly followed precedent within
the jurisdiction. The Holmes II decision accurately interpreted the lan-
guage of the FCA and, unlike Holmes I, did not read a hidden limitation
on the ability of government employees to pursue a qui tam action into
the Act. It is unclear whether Congress intended the present version of
the FCA to proscribe or include governmental employees as qui tam
plaintiffs. 325 Arguably then, the Holmes II decision appropriately fol-
lowed the plain meaning of the statute and permitted the Postmaster's
claim to proceed. If Congress had intended to prohibit government em-
ployees from bringing a qui tam suit, it could have made its intentions
more clear. The Tenth Circuit took appropriate action in Holmes II by
not engaging in judicial legislation and allowing Congress the opportu-
nity to amend the FCA as it sees fit.
Miro Kovacevic*
323. Qui Tam Statistics, supra note 9.
324. Id.
325. United States ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Ins. Group, 279 F.3d 1245, 1265-66 (10th Cir.
2002) (Briscoe, J., dissenting) ("The sponsors of the 1986 FCA amendments simply did not contem-
plate the issue of government employees using information they learned in the course of their duties
as the basis of lawsuits in their own names." (quoting Wallace, supra note 227, at 22)).
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, University of Denver College of Law.
2003]

